Years ago Peter Hall--now Sir Peter Hall--wrote a book about the "pathology of planning" that demonstrates how easy it is for experts to underestimate both the costs associated with mega-projects and the likelihood that something will go terribly wrong. Now that we are witnessing the slow-motion meltdown of nuclear reactors in Japan, it is hard not to ask the question posed by Steven Pearlstein in yesterday's Post, "The Costly Lessons from the Long Tail of Improbable Disaster." The question, as put by Pearlstein, is why we continue to underestimate the frequency of and severity of calamitous events--both natural and man-made--and how we can learn to live with a more realistic appraisal of risk. One suspects that, as President Reagan used to say, there are no easy answers--simple answers, maybe, but no easy answers.
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